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INTRODUCTION

I.

It is a privilege to comment on the paper of Robert Casad, who
probably has done more than any other American to reveal the
mysteries of jurisdiction to those who must understand that
complicated body of law or suffer its consequences.1 Professor
Casad's capacity to explain complicated doctrine to Americans made
him the logical choice to do the same in this international gathering.
He has performed the work with clarity and grace, covering a great
deal of territory and, as well, charting a course for the future.
Of course, that leaves little room for commentary, at least if the
commentator is not bent on pressing pet theories or fighting old
battles. I will try to resist those urges and to view Professor Casad's
paper as an opportunity for comparative reflection in both the
retrospective and prospective dimensions that occupy his attention.
My thinking on these matters has been shaped by teaching and writing
on issues of international civil litigation in United States courts/ and
*

David Berger Professor for the Administration of Justice, University of Pennsylvania.
I profited from the comments of Linda Silberman on a draft.
I.
See Robert C. Casad, Jurisdiction in Civil Actions at the End of the Twentieth
Century, Fomm Conveniens and Fomm Nun Conveniens, 7 TuL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 91 (1999);
ROBERT C. CASAD, JURlSDICTION IN CNIL ACTIONS (2d ed. 1991).
2.
See, e.g, Stephen B. Burbank, The Reluctant Partner: Making Procedural Law for
International Civil Litigation, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103 (Summer 1994).
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by my participation in a study group formed to advise the United
States delegation to the Hague Conference on Private International
Law in connection with the current project to fashion a treaty on the
recognition and enforcement of judgments.3
That project
contemplates a product that will at least be a "convention double,"
prescribing rules for the recognition and enforcement of judgments as
well as both required and prohibited grounds for the assertion of
jurisdiction to adjudicate.4 It may also contain a third category of
jurisdictional grounds that are neither required nor prohibited and thus
become a "convention mixte. "5
I I.

JURJSDICTION TO ADJUDICATE IN HISTORJCAL A ND COMPARATIVE
CONTEXT

A.

The Relationship Between State and Federal Law

It probably bears more emphasis than Professor Casad's paper
provides that the primary source of authority for jurisdiction to
adjudicate in state courts, which conduct the vast majority of judicial
business in the United States, is state law. This is a point easily
forgotten by Americans, and I assume that it may not be noticed by
those from other countries. It is easily forgotten here because law
school courses tend to focus, as Professor Casad's paper focuses, on
federal constitutional limitations on the exercise of state court
jurisdiction.6 Such emphasis could be explained as a concession to
the shortness of life, since in one sense federal limitations impart
uniformity to the area and make it possible, in that sense, to speak of
the " American law of jurisdiction to adjudicate."7 For many years,
and perhaps still today, it could also be explained in part by the utility
function of law professors:8 the desire of most of us to teach at least
See CATHERINE KESSEDJIAN, SYNTHESIS OF THE WORK OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSION
3.
OF MARCH 1998 ON INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION AND THE EFFECTS OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN
CIY1L AND COMMERCIAL MATTERS, PRELIMINARY DOCUMENT No. 9 (1998) [hereinafter
PRELIMINARY DOCUMENT No. 9]; CATHERINE KESSEDJIAN, SYNTHESIS OF THE WORK OF THE
SPECIAL COM!VIISSION OF JUNE 1997 ON INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION AND THE EFFECTS OF
FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL MATTERS, PRELIMINARY DOCUMENT No. 8
( 1997) [hereinafter PRELIMINARY DOCUMENT No. 8).
See PRELIMINARY DOCUMENI No. 8, supra note 3, at 11-12.
4.
See id; see also Arthur T. von Mehren, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
5.
Judgments. A New Approach for the Hague Conference?, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 27i, 272,
282-84 (Summer 1994 )
See, e.g, RlCHARD H. FIELD et. a!., CIVIL PROCEDURE 923-1083 (7th ed. 1997).
6.
Such emphasis is also consistent w ith the use of a federal model in the basic course in
7.
Civil Procedure, particularly given the choice made to borrow jurisdictional standards in most
federal civil1itigation from state law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)( I )(A).
8.
See RlCHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 109-44 ( 1995).
.

1999]

-

JURISDICTION TO ADJUDICATE

113

some constitutional law.9 In any event, it can be justified on more
practical grounds, to the extent that, explicitly or in fact, states have
tied their jurisdictional law to developing federal constitutional
standards.10
The tendency to elide state law and federal constitutional law
concerning jurisdiction to adjudicate-what I will call linkage-is not
without costs, domestically and internationally. Domestically, it may
encourage a race to the bottom, as state lawmakers consider either the
interests of their residents or the interests of their lawyers in securing
access to a local forum and do not want either to suffer competitive
disadvantage.11 When this happens, state law suffers.
Thinking about the matter in this way brings into view a second
potential cost of linkage, which is opposed to the first and has broader
Due process has both
jurisprudential roots and implications.
procedural and substantive dimensions. Both of them implicate the
proper role of the judiciary in constraining state (and federal) law, and
it is not easy to locate the law of personal jurisdiction exclusively in
either.12 During the procedural "due process explosion"13 of the
1970s, many Americans came to think and talk about due process as
marking not "the least possible good"14 one could say about a law, but
rather that which should be afforded as a normative matter. When this
happens, both state law and federal constitutional law may suffer.15
Whether or not it is helpful to think about developments in
constitutional law affecting personal jurisdiction in terms of the
See i d at 87.
9.
10. See Casad, supra note 1, at 104; see also Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604,
639 n.14 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
11.
"States have little incentive to limit rules such as transient jurisdiction that make it
easier for their own citizens to sue out-of-state defendants." Burnham, 495 U.S. at 639 n.14
(Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) (emphasis in original).
12.
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), which involved personal
jurisdiction, may have initiated the modem debate on the Supreme Court about the proper role of
the judiciary in interpreting the constitutional command. See id. at 323-26 (separate opinion of
Black, J.). That debate, which is more famously associated with issues like abortion, see Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973 ), continued in connection with procedural due process, see Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 272-279 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting), as it did in the jurisdictional
context. See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 622-27 (opinion of Scalia, J.); id at 633-37 (opinion of
Brennan, J.). In addition, the Court in International Shoe drew on procedural due process cases.
See infra text accompanying note 30.
13. Henry J. Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267, 1268 (1975).
"To say that a law does not violate the due process clause is to say the least possible
14.
good about it." Elliott E. Cheatham, Conflict of Laws.· Some Developments and Some Questions,
25 ARK. L. REv. 9, 25 (1971).
15.
Cf William B. Fisch & Richard S. Kay, The Constitutionalization of Law in the
United States, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 437, 456-62 (1998) (discussing remedies and
"judicialization"); infra text accompanying note 42 (linkage hinders comparative perspective).
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procedural due process revolution, that revolution is long over,16 and
the third and most obvious cost of linkage has been incurred. Both
the changing contours of due process and its fact dependency have
exacerbated the uncertainty of state jurisdictional standards founded
in federal constitutional limitations.17
Internationally, this American phenomenon of linkage might
have augured significant advantages, if it had yielded a relatively
determinate "American law." Instead, however, it has imposed
substantial costs as a result both of the uncertainty of jurisdictional
standards tied to changing (but ever fact-dependent) constitutional
norms and of the inevitably exorbitant18 appearance of jurisdictional
law that started as a floor and became a bed.
The same phenomenon may be in part responsible for difficulties
Americans have experienced in attempting to explain American law
to their colleagues abroad, including at The Hague. This is not to say
that, for instance, Europeans would accept all of the jurisdictional
bases set forth in a typical state long-arm statute of the elaborating
type (that is, one that does not simply refer to and incorporate federal
constitutional standards).19 Starting at that level, however, not only
would be sounder as a jurisprudential matter, but would also provide
more hope of shared understanding than starting and ending with the
opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States.20
Proceeding as I suggest might be misleading if anyone believed
as a result that the chosen "American" model was typical. That would
be a risk if the comparative project were descriptive. It should not be
a risk in a project whose aim is a treaty, such as the current project at
The Hague. Indeed, the perspective taken here could be of value not
only in educating our colleagues abroad about American law but also
in educating ourselves.
In the process of reaching compromises with delegates from
other countries, the American delegates would do well to remember
that due process is a floor and, thus, that there is room to live above it.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); see also Jeny L. Mashaw, The
Mathews v. Eldridge:
Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. Cl-n. L. REv. 28 (1976).
1 7.
See Casad, supra note 1, at 7, 10.
For a discussion of exorbitant fora in connection with current deliberations at The
! 8.
Hague, see PRELIMINARY DOCUMENT No. 8, supra note 3, at 59-63 and Annex V I.
19. See, e.g, UNIF. INTERSTATE AND lNT'L PROC. ACT§ 1.03, 13 U.L.A. 361-62 (1986)
(personal jurisdiction based on conduct).
20.
Cf Stephen B. Burbank, Federal Judgments Law. Sources of Authority and Sources
of Rules, 70 TEX. L. REv. 1551, 1575-76 (1992) (uniform state judgments recognition and
enforcement legislation prompted by difficulties encountered in other countries accustomed to
codified law).

16.

See, e.g.,

Mathews

v.

Supreme Courts Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in
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They might also find it easier to accept that, when one views the
United States as the relevant territory, there is no need to insist on the
availability of every basis of jurisdiction to adjudicate found in the
law of the fifty states and/or found not to violate due process, and
conversely, no need to resist a single basis that might violate due
process if asserted by a state court.21 If the time comes to consider
whether to adopt compromises made at The Hague as federal law, the
same perspective should ease the burdens of those concerned about
either the legal or the political problems of federalism.22
B.

Tag Jurisdiction

Professor Casad's paper well describes both the historical
importance of physical presence in the development of American
ideas about jurisdiction to adjudicate and the current constitutional
law regarding it.23 International and comparative perspectives on that
subject permit me to explore further the problems and opportunities
afforded by the interplay of state and federal law. In addition, tag
jurisdiction provides a test of the positive dimensions of Professor
Casad's claims concerning the role of interest balancing in the
application of constitutional norms.24
1.

International and Comparative Perspectives

In previous work I have noted the irony that, although the
foundations of American constitutional law concerning personal
jurisdiction were thought to lie in public international law, the
cornerstone of the foundation, physical presence in the state at the
time process is served, is no longer an acceptable basis for the
assertion of personal jurisdiction internationally.25
11oreover,
although Professor Casad is correct to mention the division on the
Supreme Court of the United States in the Burnham case/6 we agree
21.
Cf FED. R. C!v. P. 4(1<)(2) (authorizing exercise of jurisdiction consistent with the
Constitution in federal question case where defendant is not subject to the jurisdiction of the
courts of general jurisdiction of any state).
22.
See Patrick J. Borchers, Judgments Conventions and Minimum Contacts, 61 ALB. L.
REv. 1161, 1174-75 (1998). For an example of the use of federal legislative power to override
state (personal and subject matter) jurisdictional law, see 28 U.S. C. §§ 1602-1611 (1994) (foreign
sovereign immunity).
See Casad, supra note I, at 98, I 07
23.
24.
See id at I 04.
25. See Stephen B. Burbank, The World in Our Courts, 89 MICH. L. REv. 1456, 1468
n.66 (1991) (book review).
26.
See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990); see also Casad, supra note I , at
103.
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the important role that it once played in mitigating the rigors of a
territorial system highly protective of defendants when travel was
difficult and expensive, and thus serving the interests of plaintiffs and
states. 38 In that regard, tag jurisdiction is a species of general
jurisdiction, and thus does not require any connection between the
defendant's contacts in the state and the plaintiff's claims.39
When one considers another basis of general jurisdiction, namely
domicile/state of incorporation,40 it is apparent that such bases are not
immune to "interest balancing" as a means of justifying a
contemporary conclusion that an assertion of jurisdiction is not
fundamentally unfair. The states of the United States have a shared
interest in providing at least one place where a person or corporation
can be sued-a jurisdictional "headquarters"41-an interest that is
shared by plaintiffs. In light of these interests, a person or corporation
that has purposefully established such a relationship with a state
cannot properly complain that an assertion of jurisdiction is so unfair
as to be unconstitutional.
This suggests that another cost for federal constitutional law of
the linkage we see today lies in the loss of comparative perspective
that may occur when due process is formulated knowing that it will
serve as the source of rules for state law. Otherwise, due process
might serve "as an instrument of interstate federalism"42 by taking
account dynamically of the adjudicatory jurisdictional landscape
within the United States as a whole, adjusting the constitutional floor
when new grounds became available that diminished the need for
others and hence altered the balance of interests broadly viewed. That
is one way to understand the Supreme Court's decision in Shaffer v.
Heitner,43 and understanding it that way makes Burnham no less
difficult to reconcile.44
38. See Weinstein, supra note 29, at 53-54. Note that similar reasoning can be used to
justify the use of tag jurisdiction in exceptional cases even today. See Koh, supra note 33, at 145.
39.
See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 607 (opinion of Scalia, J.) ("a suit unrelated to his activities
in the State").
40. See, e.g, Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
41. Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U.S. 619, 625 (1914) ("technically preeminent
headquarters that every person is compelled to have in order that certain rights and duties that
have been attached to it by the law may be determined"); see Arthur T. Von Mehren & Donald T.
Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate. A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1121, 1137, 1179
(1966).
42. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980).
43. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
44.
Accordingly, in its day, and as part and parcel of an entire jurisdictional system, a rule
that in-state service was sufficient may well have been "reasonable, in the context of
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This way of looking at jurisdiction to adjudicate may also be
helpful to our delegates at The Hague. It appears that delegates from
other countries have had difficulty accepting the basis of asserting
general jurisdiction to adjudicate that we call "doing business."45 It is
probably too late in the day for an assertion of jurisdiction on this
basis in a state where the defendant conducts substantial business
systematically and continuously to be held unconstitutional.46 Yet, the
advent of aggressive forms of specific jurisdiction, coupled with the
headquarters basis of general jurisdiction, should cause one who
believes in interest balancing and in due process "as an instrument of
interstate federalism"47 in the sense used above, to pause over that
question. So perhaps should its origins in a fiction that is tied to
territorial notions of presence.48
In any event, the domestic
comparative approach should help American delegates not to insist on
this ground internationally, at least if other bases brought into focus
by that approach are essentially preserved. Surrender should be even
easier if it is proposed to include more limited forms of "doing
business" jurisdiction, such as those that favor consumers.49
III. FORUM NON CONVENIENS
Professor Casad points out that " [c ]ontinental European
countries generally reject the doctrine of forum non conveniens."50
Their reaction is due in part to the theoretical difficulty he notes of a
court that has competence or jurisdiction and is refusing to exercise
our federal system of government." But now that the restrictive service of process
requirement has been replaced with the more flexible "minimum contacts" test, the
overbroad rule of sufficiency may no longer be fair and proper. More significantly, a
due process standard that focuses on the historical existence of a single rule, isolated
from the web of other rules in which it functioned is questionable, to say the least.
Weinstein, supra note 29, at 54 (footnotes omitted).
45. See PRELIMINARY DOCUMENT No. 8, supra note 3, at 63; id. at Annex V I;
PRELIMINARY DOCUMENT No. 9, supra note 3, at 30.
46.
See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984).
But see Burnham, 495 U.S. at 610 n.l (opinion of Scalia, J. ) (suggesting that, as a constitutional
matter, general jurisdiction on the basis of doing business may be restricted to corporations).
4 7. Supra text accompanying note 42.
"A foreign corporation is amenable to process to enforce a personal liability, in the
48.
absence of consent, only if it is doing business within the State in such manner as to warrant the
inference that it is present there." Philadelphia & Reading Railway v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264,
265 ( 1917); see also International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-17 (1945).
49.
See PRELIMINARY DOCUMENT No. 8, supra note 3, at 41-43; see also PERMANENT
BUREAU OF THE HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OUT
LINE TO ASSIST IN THE PREPARATION OF A CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION AJ\,'0 THE
EFFECTS OF fOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL MATTERS, INFORMATION DOCUMENT
No. 2, at 13 (Sept. 1998) (Article 7-Contracts with Consumers).
50.
Casad, supra note I, at I06 footnote omitted).
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it.51 In part it is also due to another related theoretical difficulty,
namely, doctrine that expressly vests enormous discretion in the
court.52 A third basis for rejection, I suspect, is the lack of perceived
need for such an equilibrating device in systems whose rules of
jurisdiction to adjudicate are relatively determinate and also relatively
conservative vis a vis defendants/3 as are the rules in the Brussels54
and Lugano55 Conventions.
Although forum non conveniens can be traced back a long way
in Scots law, it has a short history in American courts outside of
admiralty and maritime cases. 56 Moreover, the jurisprudential puzzle
that dismays our European colleagues is no less puzzling here, at least
when one considers the federal courts. That may explain why, in
rationalizing and limiting the power of the federal courts to dismiss
cases by abstaining in favor of state courts in the Quackenbush case,
the Supreme Court recognized, but did not seek to justify, forum non
conveniens as discrete.57 Of course, the discretionary nature of the
doctrine is not otherwise problematic in most American courts, and
there is widely recognized need for the relief it provides in states
whose rules are neither determinate nor conservative.58
Professor Casad identifies and explores a potential anomaly
created by supposed convergence between the factors that a court
considers in determining whether to dismiss under forum non
conveniens and the factors "that must be examined under the
International Shoe doctrine to see whether the court has
jurisdiction."59 He finds it "hard to visualize a case where the balance
51.
52.

See id.
See

Joachim Zekoll, The Role and Status of American Law in the Hague Judgments
61 ALB. L. REv. 1283, 1299-1300 (1998); Wendy Kennett, Forum Non
Conveniens in Europe, 54 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 552, 559-61 ( 1995); Burbank, supra note 25, at 146465.
53. See Zekoll, supra note 52, at 1297-1300.
54. Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, 1972 O.J. (L 299) 32, as amended by 1990 O.J. (C 189) 1. For the
subsequent history of the Brussels Convention, see von Mehren, supra note 5, at 275.
55. Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, Sept. 16, 1988, 1988 O.J. (L 319). See von Mehren, supra note 5, at 27576.
56. See Allan R. Stein, Forum Non Conveniens and the Redundancy of Court-Access
Doctrine, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 781, 795-812 (1985).
See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 721-23 (1996); Stephen B.
57.
Burbank, The United States' Approach to International Civil Litigation: Recent Developments in
Forum Selection, 19 U. PA. J. lNT'LECON. L. 1, 17 (1998).
See, eg, Zekoll, supra note 52, at 1298-99.
58.
Casad, supra note I, at 105; see Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia ex rel. State
59.
Corporation Commission, 339 U.S. 643, 649 (1950) ("Such factors have been given great weight
in applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens.").
Convention Project,
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of interests makes the forum fundamentally fair, but where the forum
is seriously inconvenient and the balance is so strongly in favor of the
defendant that the plaintiff's forum choice should be rejected."60 He
also seems to suggest that the anomaly does not arise very often,
because "the doctrine of forum non conveniens is essentially limited
to cases where the defendant's forum contacts are so substantial as to
permit jurisdiction there for any cause of action, no matter where it
arose,"61 in other words, cases involving general jurisdiction.
Assuming for purposes of discussion that the factors are the
same, the supposed anomaly exists only if one thinks about "the
International Shoe doctrine" as designed to determine "whether the
court has jurisdiction" and thinks about interest balancing as designed
to determine whether "the forum [is] fundamentally fair." It does not
exist if one views the role of federal law as checking assertions of
jurisdiction that are fundamentally unfair62 and recalls that the source
of authority for the forum non conveniens doctrine applied in state
courts is state law.63
Even taking the view of International Shoe that Professor Casad
adopts, the anomaly may not have been presented very often if the
lower courts followed the lead of the Supreme Court. After the Court
renewed its attention to the constitutional limitations on state court
jurisdiction in 1977 and until recently, there was very little evidence
of actual interest balancing in the decisions of the Supreme Court.
Instead, the continuing influence of territoriality gave references to
interests, as opposed to contacts, the quality of lip service. 64
It may be that Professor Casad is correct in his empirical
assertion that forum non conveniens is "essentially limited to cases"
of general jurisdiction.65 But if, as he contends, interest balancing is
or should be part of the constitutional analysis of general jurisdiction
as it is of specific jurisdiction,66 one would expect to encounter the
same anomaly.
This may suggest either that the supposed
convergence of factors does not exist or that interest balancing has no
role, or a different role, to play in connection with general
jurisdiction. Both may be true.

60. See Casad, supra note I, at I05.
61.
!d.
62. See supra text accompanying notes 12-16.
See American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443 (1994) (admiralty).
63.
See, e.g., Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 213-16 (1977); Kulko v. Superior Court,
64.
436 U.S. 84,92 (1978); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
See Casad, supra note I, at I05.
65
66. See id. at I 05-06.
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Although interest balancing is part of the contemporary
American approach to both forum non conveniens and constitutional
limitations on state court jurisdiction, it may be important to refine
Professor Casad's assertion that the same factors are weighed in the
balance. The forum non conveniens analysis is, or at least is
supposed to be, far more particularistic in connection with both
private interests and public interests,67 and if it is not, it is probably a
mask for choice of law.68
I suggested above that, notwithstanding Justice Brennan's
opinion in Burnham , interest balancing cannot save most assertions of
tag jurisdiction,69 but I argued that it could be used to justify
domicile/place of incorporation.70 The interest balancing I employed
was, like the ground of jurisdiction, categorical. The other ground of
general jurisdiction discussed above, doing business, occupies
intermediate territory, which is to say that, even assuming substantial
defendant activity that is systematic and continuous, it is not clearly
immune to constitutional attack on the basis of categorical, ex ante
interest balancing. If ex post the courts make no effort to consider
interests other than those suggested by the defendant's activities in the
forum, forum non conveniens serves as a critically important
equilibrating device.
Given the theoretical problems that forum non conveniens poses
for continental European systems, it is no surprise that the American
delegates to The Hague have encountered resistance to the notion that
the doctrine be a recognized feature of any treaty concluded.71
Certainly, the existence of those problems must mean that no
signatory state should be required to apply the doctrine in its courts.
Beyond that, it would seem advantageous to all signatory states that a
convention which is likely to be more adventurous than the Brussels
and Lugano Conventions accommodate such a safety valve in those
states whose legal traditions permit it. I am assuming a requirement
that there be an alternative forum available in another signatory state72
and that, as a result of its location in another signatory state, no
inquiry concerning its adequacy would be permitted. 73 To the extent
See, e.g, Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
67.
See Stein, supra note 56, at 831-40.
68.
See supra text accompanying notes 35-37.
69.
70. See supra text accompanying notes 40-41.
71. See PRELIMINARY DOCUMENT No. 9, supra note 3, at 42-44.
Compare Kennett's suggestion for a modified version of forum non conveniens under
72.
the Brussels Convention, whereby it "would not operate in cases where the plaintiff was
domiciled in a Contracting State." Kennett, supra note 52, at 568-69.

73.
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that even that departure from the model of a "convention double"
proved controversial, the American delegates might have an easier
time in negotiations if they were willing to accept in return the
Brussels Convention approach to lis pendens. 74
IV. -CONCLUSION
Professor Casad is correct that many courts, including the court
that decided it, and many commentators, have misinterpreted
International Shoe,75 and his suggested analytical approach seems to
me more faithful to that case and to due process jurisprudence than
the bifurcated approach taken in both of the two main opinions in
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court,76 let alone the lip service
given to interests (other than those suggested by the defendant's
contacts) in so many decisions before Asahi.77
These comments reflect my sense that, both domestically and
internationally, that may be the wrong project. Resting on a floor that
moves, and consisting in many rooms of nothing but that floor, the
American house of jurisdiction to adjudicate is not a place where any
sensible person other than a lawyer (if that is not redundant) wants to
live. It is time to renovate the rooms, and in doing so, we may profit
greatly from the fact that some of the revised design may be required,
and that all of it can be influenced, by a collaborative international
architectural project.

The Brussels and Lugano Conventions do not permit the dismissal of actions on
grounds of forum nonconveniens. The Conventions thus mirror the prevailing opinion
in most civil law nations that the plaintiff's choice of a particular forum should not be
disturbed as long as a jurisdictional rule permits this choice. This solution is seen as
providing legal certainty and avoiding costly, and potentially offensive, litigation over
the adequacy of the courts involved.
Zekoll, supra note 52, at 1297 (footnotes omitted).
In the event of duplicative litigation, Article 21 of the Brussels Convention, supra
74.
note 54, requires that "any court other than the court first seized shall of its own motion stay its
proceedings until such time as the jurisdiction of the court first seized is established," and when it
is established, "shall decline jurisdiction in favour of that court." See PRELIMINARY DocUMENT
No. 9, supra note 3, at 44. On lis pendens in federal courts, see Burbank, supra note 57, at 14-17.
See Casad, supra note I, at I07-08.
7 5.
76.
See Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113-16 (1987); id at
116-21 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); see also Casad, supra note
I, at 108-09.
77.
See supra text accompanying note 64.

